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This paper examines regional constitutional justice in Russia as a microcosm of the struggle for 
the judicial branch of state power to assert its importance, in particular in relation to separation 
of powers. We consider the situation of republican constitutional courts and regional charter 
courts which have been established in some places to oversee compliance with the republican 
constitution or regional charter. We note that the limited number of these courts contrasts 
strongly with the widespread institution of the regional ombudsman (plenipotentiary for human 
rights). We also see that in recent years courts in some regions have encountered a pushback 
from the other branches of state power. The strength of the resulting defence of the courts’ legal 
status gives us some cause for optimism that the principles of separation of powers and rule of 
law are being strongly supported in some regions. 
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1  Introduction 
Russia claims to be a rule of law state (Article 1, 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation; 
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hereinafter, Constitution RF)1 and under Article 10 that the “agencies of legislative, executive, 
and judicial power shall be autonomous.” 2 Both principles of rule of law and separation of 
powers should operate not only at national level with the federal agencies of State power, but 
also within the subjects of the Russian Federation.  
According to Constitution RF Article 65, as amended in 20143, Russia currently regards 
herself as having 85 federation subjects. These are of different types: republics4, territories5, 
regions6, cities of federal significance7, an autonomous region8, and (within other federation 
                                                 
1 “The Russian Federation – Russia is a democratic federated rule of law state [pravovoe gosudarstvo] with a 
republic form of government.” in translation: William E. Butler, Russian Public Law (Wildy, Simmons & Hill 
Publishers, London, 2013, third revised edition), 4; updated version William E. Butler, “Translation of The 
Constitution of the Russian Federation,” 1 The Uppsala Yearbook of Eurasian Studies (2014), 309-52. In Peter 
Maggs, Olga Schwartz and William Burnham, Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation (Juris Publishing 
Inc., Huntingdon, New York, 2015, sixth edition) at 875 the Russian word federativnoe is translated as federal.) See 
also, for example, Dmitrii Nikolaevich Mironov, “Osnovy formirovaniia pravovogo [Fundamentals for the 
Formation of a Law-based State],” 3(6) Konstitutsionnoe i Munitsipal’noe Pravo (2016), 6-10.  
2 Butler, op.cit. note 1, 4.  
3 See Jane Henderson, “The 2014 amendments to the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation,” 1 The Uppsala 
Yearbook of Eurasian Studies (2014), 279-82, and Anna Jonsson Cornell, “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea – A 
Violation of Russian Constitutional Law?” 1 The Uppsala Yearbook of Eurasian Studies (2014), 263-8. 
4 22 republics: Adygeia, Altai, Bashkortostan, Buriatiia, Dagestan, Ingushetiia, Kabardino-Balkariia, Kalmykiia, 
Karachaevo-Cherkesskaia, Kareliia, Komi, Crimea, Marii El, Mordoviia, Sakha (Iakutiia), Northern Osetia-Alaniia, 
Tatarstan, Tyva, Udmurt, Khakasiia, Chechnia, Chuvashiia. 
5 9 territories (kraia): Altai, Zabaikal, Kamchat, Krasnodar, Krasnoiar, Perm, Maritime (Primorskii), Stavropol, 
Khabarov 
6 46 regions (oblastei): Amur, Arkhangel, Astrakhan, Belgorod, Briansk, Vladimir, Volgograd, Vologda, Voronezh, 
Ivanovo, lrkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Kirov, Kostroma, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Magadan, 
Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhegorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Orlovsk, Penza, Pskov, Rostov, 
Riazan, Samara, Saratov, Sakhalin, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk Region, Tambov, Tver, Tomsk, Tula, Tiumen, 
Ul'ianovsk, Cheliabinsk, laroslavl. 
7 3 cities of federal significance: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sevastopol. 




subjects) a few autonomous national areas.9 Each has its own constitutive document.10 For 
republics, this is a constitution; for the other federation subjects, it is called a charter (ustav).11 
Each federation subject has its own executive and legislation. There is indeed a federal law 
setting out the ‘general principles’ which must apply to their organization;12 its provisions have 
been subject to scrutiny on a number of occasions by the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation (CCRF).13 
However, the situation with respect to courts and the judiciary is more complex. Under 
Constitution RF Article 71, which delineates jurisdiction between the federation and its subjects, 
organization is a federal matter and there is “Unity of the Judicial System”,14 as well as 
autonomy of courts and independence of judges.15 Under Article 3 the FCL on the Judicial 
System each federation subject houses federal courts, but may also have non-federal courts in the 
form of justice of the peace courts and a constitutional (or charter) court.16 In the following 
                                                 
9 4 autonomous national areas (avtonomnye okruga): Nenetskii, Khanty-Mansiiskii-Iurga, Chukotskii, Iamalo-
Nenetskii. 
10 See Constitution RF Art.5. 
11 The only difference is that Republics may each adopt their constitution in whatever way they like; in other federal 
subjects the legislative agency adopts the charter. For further discussion of this difference see Jane Henderson and 
Marina Belykh, “The Protection of Rights in Russia’s Regions – the Role of the Constitutional and Charter Courts,” 
2 Russian Law, Theory and Practice (2016), 4-12, 7. 
12 Federal law of 6 October 1999 no 184-FZ “Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh 
(prednodatel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organiv gosundarstvennoi vlasti sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii”. English 
translation as “Federal law on general principles of organization of legislative (or representative) and executive 
agencies of State power of subjects of the Russian Federation” updated to 2 April 2013 in Butler, op.cit. note 1, 714-
74.  
13 E.g. Judgment of the CCRF of 24 December 2012 N 32-P; Judgment of the CCRF of 14 May 2013 N 9-P; Ruling 
of the CCRF of 6 November 2014 N 2427-O. 
14 The heading to Art.3; ibid. 
15 Constitution RF Art.120(1) Butler, op.cit. note 1, 27; FCL on the Judicial System Art.5, Butler, op.cit. note 1, 386. 
16 On the justice of the peace courts see e.g. Jane Henderson, “Justices of the Peace in Russia,” 5(3) European 
Public Law (1999), 373-80; Kathryn Hendley, “The Unsung Heroes of the Russian Judicial System: The Justice-of-





sections we consider these regional constitutional (or charter) courts, and recent controversies 
concerning them. 
 
2 Overview of Regional Constitutional Justice 
As noted, each of the Russian Federation subjects has its own constitution or charter.17 The 
Constitution RF requires that it must be consistent with its own provisions18 but otherwise 
federation subjects are free to adopt whatever content they feel is appropriate.  
Despite differences in format and length, all the constitutions and charters give support to 
the “rights of man and citizen”. At least 66 of the 85 make direct reference to the rights set out in 
the Constitution RF; some also list specific substantive rights, occasionally adding detail not in 
the Constitution RF.19 As a result, all inhabitants in Russia have at least two pieces of legislation 
which guarantee them rights20: the Constitution RF, and the constitution or charter of the 
federation subject where they live. However, the extent to which these rights are enforced 
through judicial constitutional control is a problematic issue. 
In respect to the Constitution RF, there is a well-known, and in general well-respected, 
federal Constitutional Court which oversees compliance.21 Originally established in 1991 as the 
                                                 
17 Almost all are available at <http://constitution.garant.ru/region/>. 
18 See Constitution RF Arts.15(1) and 76(4), (5) and (6). Whilst in the 1990s in practice this provision was 
sometimes ignored, after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, there was a policy initiative to rein in 
nonconformity to federal legislation as part of a stabilizing ‘vertical of power’. 
19 In particular, the charters of the four Autonomous National Areas also guarantee the rights of their ‘small 
peoples’, as does the constitution of Iakutiia. See Henderson and Belykh, op.cit. note 11, 8. 
20 Note that the Constitution RF does give some rights to citizens and some to ‘all’ or ‘each’: see Ger van den Berg, 
“Human Rights in the Legislation and the Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation,” 18(3) Review of Central 
and East European Law (1992) 197-251, 235. “The regulation and defense of the rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen” is listed in Constitution RF Art.71 (paragraph c) as being within the competence of the federal authorities, 
but Art.72 (paragraph b) gives joint jurisdiction of the federation and federation subjects for “defense of the rights 
and freedoms of man and citizen”. 
21 There is a wide academic literature on the Russian Constitutional Court. Works in English include: Jane 
Henderson, “The Russian Constitutional Court and the Communist Party case: Watershed or whitewash?” 40 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2007), 1-16; Jane Henderson, “The Constitutional Court of the Russian 




RSFSR Constitutional Court (overseeing the 1978 RSFSR Constitution, as amended), from its 
early years it quickly became an important feature in Russia’s legal and political landscape, as 
during the Yel’tsin years all sides were happy to use it as a potential tool against political 
adversaries.22 Following the adoption of the 1993 Constitution RF it was re-established as the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (CCRF) by the 1994 FCL on the Constitutional 
Court.23 Its long-time and somewhat outspoken Chairman Valerii Zor’kin has ensured that the 
CCRF’s profile has stayed prominent in the media,24 and its thoughtful and generally 
independent judges have given rise to an impressive body of federal constitutional case law.25 
The situation is quite different in relation to the enforcement of a federation subject’s 
constitution or charter. There is nothing about this in the Constitution RF. However, under 
Article 27 of the 1996 FCL on the Judicial System, the legislature of a federation subject may 
establish its own constitutional or charter court to oversee observance of its foundational law.26 
The FCL sets out the court’s role to be: 
 
to consider questions of the conformity of laws of the subject of the Russian Federation, 
normative legal acts of agencies of State power of the subject of the Russian Federation 
and agencies of local self-government of the subject of the Russian Federation to the 
constitution (or charter) of the subject of the Russian Federation, and also in order to 
                                                 
Law (2008), 138-157; Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia: The Role of the Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 
1990-2006 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008); Carla L. Thorson, Politics, Judicial Review, and the 
Russian Constitutional Court (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012). 
22 See e.g. Jane Henderson, “Making a Drama out of a Crisis: The Russian Constitutional Court and the Case of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” 19(3) King’s Law Journal (2008), 489–506. 
23 English translation as amended to 25 December 2012 in Butler, op.cit. note 1, 527-61. 
24 Zor’kin has been CCRF Chair from 1 November 1991 to 5 October 1993, then again from 23 February 2003 to 
date, following repeated reconfirmations.  
25 The CCRF publishes is decisions online at <http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/Decision/Pages/default.aspx> although not all 
rulings are included; see William B. Simons, “Russia’s Constitutional Court and a Decade of Hard Cases: a 
Postscript,” 28(3/4) Review of Central and East European Law (2002-3), 655-78. 




interpret the constitution (or charter) of the subject of the Russian Federation.27 
 
A CCRF Ruling (opredelenie)28 of 6 March 200329 supported the principle that the regional 
legislation establishing such a court may assign it other roles, so long as these are appropriate for 
such a judicial agency, and that the subject matter is within the federation subject’s jurisdiction 
as set out in Constitution RF Article 73. One example of such an additional role is oversight of 
the process for declaring the regional governor incapacitated through ill-health.30  
A regional constitutional or charter court would clearly have an important role in 
overseeing the exercise of power by the federation subject’s government (executive) and 
legislature. Both of these would be constrained through judicial oversight to act within the 
powers granted to them by the relevant constitution or charter. The regional court would thus 
uphold separation of powers as an important aspect of rule of law.  
Jurisdiction of regional constitutional and charter courts, while different to some extent 
from court to court, is comparatively limited. There are gateway provisions for each court 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 391. 
28 In this paper we have decided to adopt the translation convention for decisions (resheniia) of the CCRF that 
postanovlenie is a judgment; zakliuchenie is a conclusion and opredelenie as a ruling. This is the same as the 
translations used on the CCRF website except for zakliuchenie which is rendered as ‘declaratory judgment’ 
(compare the Russian text of Art.71 at <http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/Info/LegalBases/FCL/Pages/Chapter2.aspx> with the 
Court’s English translation at <http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Info/LegalBases/FCL/Pages/Chapter2.aspx>. It also differs 
from the translations of terminology in the special issues on Russian’s Constitutional Court, in 27(2/3) Review of 
Central and East European Law (2001) and 28(3/4) Review of Central and East European Law (2002-3) where Ger 
van den Berg uses the rather literal translation of decree for postanovlenie and calls opredelenie determinations. The 
authors are grateful for advice from Mikhail Antonov on this matter, although of course we take full responsibility 
for our choice.  
29 Ruling of the Constitutional Court RF “O proverke konstitutsionnosti chasti 1 stat’i 27 
Federal’nogo Konstitutsionnogo Zakona ‘O sudebnoi sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii’,” No.103-O, 
6 March 2003, SZRF (2003) No.17 item 1658. See discussion in Marina Lomovtseva and Jane Henderson, 
“Constitutional Justice in Russia,” 34 Review of Central and East European Law (2009), 37-69, 49-50. 
30 See Jane Henderson, “Regional Constitutional Justice in the Russian Federation” 14(1) European Public Law 




defining the range of those who may bring cases to court.31 In many courts we see not only the 
possibility (although not obligation) of cases being referred from a domestic court if an issue of 
constitutionality arises (as is the situation with the CCRF) but also the possibility in several of 
the courts that individuals can petition directly for abstract judicial review (as used to be allowed 
by the CC RSFSR).32 One example is in the Sverdlovsk Regional Charter Court, where an 
application can be made whether or not there is a concrete case in a court of general jurisdiction. 
We now arrive at the most problematic aspect for these courts. Unfortunately, the wording 
of the 1996 FCL on the Judicial System makes it clear that federation subjects are not under any 
duty to create a constitutional or charter court. The legislation says they may—mozhet—if they 
wish, but they have no obligation to do so. This raises enormous problems of substantive 
unfairness. As things stand, only 16 out of the 85 federation subjects have an operative court, so 
that inhabitants in 69 regions lack the opportunity to defend their constitutional or charter rights 
in a court. This lack of appropriate courts, breaching the principle of equal treatment, has drawn 
adverse comment for a number of years, including by the current authors.33 
Before we turn to the courts and their problems, however, we must flag up the curious 
contrast with the regional plenipotentiaries for human rights. 
 
3 The Contrast with Regional Ombudsmen (and women) 
 
As noted, only a small minority of the Russian Federation subjects have effective working courts 
exercising constitutional control. This stands in very stark contrast to the regional 
plenipotentiaries for human rights, also known as human rights ombudsmen (or ombudswomen; 
of the 85 listed, 51 are male and 34 female, so an exact 60%:40% ratio). Every single federation 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 29, where it was noted that at that time only in Northern Ossetiia-Alaniia could citizens directly bring cases 
to court. 
32 The issue of citizens’ access to constitutional justice is discussed in an article by the chairman of the Republic 
Ingushetiia constitutional court: Aiup Karimsultanovich Gagiev, “Dostupnost’ konstitutsionnogo pravosudiia dlia 
grazhdan [Access to Constitutional Justice for individuals],” 3 Zhurnal konstitutisionnogo pravosudiia (2015), 28-
30. 




subject has its own plenipotentiary.34  
Central legislation dealing with the office of regional ombudsman has also developed 
rather more quickly than that relating to regional constitutional or charter courts. For both, the 
starting point is a Federal Constitutional Law allowing the possibility. For the courts, as noted 
earlier, this is the 1996 FCL On the Judicial System which said a federation subject may set up 
such a court. Similarly, Article 5 of 1997 FCL on the Plenipotentiary for Human Rights in the 
Russian Federation has the equivalent permissive wording for establishing a regional 
ombudsman: 
 
(1) In accordance with the constitution (or charter) or law of a subject of the Russian 
Federation the post of Plenipotentiary for Human Rights in the subject of the Russian 
Federation may be instituted. [Emphasis added] 
(2) The financing of the activity of the Plenipotentiary for Human Rights in a subject of the 
Russian Federation and the apparatus thereof shall be effectuated from assets of the 
budget of the subject of the Russian Federation.35 
 
It is also within federation subjects’ residual rights, set out in Constitution RF Article 73, to 
legislate on any matter not relegated by Article 71 to the central authorities, nor specified in 
Article 72 as being within joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and federation subjects. 
Establishing a regional ombudsman clearly fits those criteria. 
However, federal law on the ombudsmen has progressed further. On 17 April 2015 a 
federal law came into force which for the first time specified the procedure for the appointment 
of regional ombudsmen as well as the requirements for candidates to the post, aspects of their 
                                                 
34 See names and addresses at <http://ombudsmanrf.org/russia/ombudsmans>. In a paper delivered at the 
International Society of Public Law (ICON) Conference 17-19 June 2016, Henderson noted at that time that there 
were “only 3 subjects of the Federation without an ombudsman – Republic Tyva, city of federal significance 
Sevastopol, and Chukotsk Autonomous National Area (despite specific mention in the Tyva Constitution and 
Chukotsk charter.)” Clearly appropriate action has been taken in the intervening time to remedy this situation. 




role, and rights and duties.36 Detailed rules, including the procedure for citizens to raise 
complaints to them, and the measures they may take in response, are left to regional legislation. 
But the federal consolidation of their main powers through this 2015 law strengthened the 
ombudsman’s position in dealing with regional state agencies. 
A press report in July 2017 raised the possibility of further federal legislation expanding 
the rights of regional ombudsmen.37 The Coordination Council of Ombudsmen submitted to the 
Federation Council a Concept for a draft law “On the General Principles of the Organization and 
Activity of Human Rights Ombudsman in the Subjects of the Russian Federation” but despite 
support from the current federal ombudsman, Tatiana Moskalkova, at the present time no draft 
has yet been submitted to the Duma.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine closely how ombudsmen fit within the 
constellation of methods and agencies for protecting rights in Russia, and to give any overall 
assessment of their effectiveness.38 Certainly there are strong examples of effective regional 
ombudsmen, for example the long-serving Sverdlovsk region ombudswoman, Tatiana 
Georgievna Merzliakova, who is a well-known public figure.39  
The apparent enthusiasm at federal level40 for regional ombudsmen strongly counterpoints 
the comparative lack of federal activity to support regional constitutional or charter courts. It is 
possible one factor might be financial; the regional budgets must cover both the cost of the 
                                                 
36 Federal law of 6 April 2015 No.76-FZ “O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v tseliakh sovershenstvovaniia deiatel’nosti upolnomochennykh po pravam cheloveka” available at 
<http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/617608/>. 
37 Irina Nagornykh, “Regional’nym ombudsmenam rasshiriat prava,” Kommersant’ (no 134 of 26 July 2017), 3 
available at <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3366992>. 
38 Articles in English on the Russian ombudsman include Emma Gilligan, “The Human Rights Ombudsman in 
Russia: The Evolution of Horizontal Accountability,” 32(3) Human Rights Quarterly (2010), 575-600; Sinikukka 
Saari, “Norm of a Human Rights Ombudsman” in her Promoting Democracy and Human Rights (Routledge, 
London, New York, 2010), 32-51. 
39 Her annual reports are available at <http://ombudsman.midural.ru/article/show/id/1012> and special reports at 
<http://ombudsman.midural.ru/article/show/id/1014>.  
40 See for example President Vladimir Putin’s speech to regional ombudsmen, 16 August 2012, “Vstupitel’noe slovo 
na vstreche s upolnomochennymi po pravom cheloveka v sub”ektakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii 16 avgusta 2012”, 
available at <https://vk.com/video-23977193_163185694>. 
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regional ombudsmen and their office, and also, if established, the regional constitutional or 
charter court. We do not have the data to say whether one or the other is in general cheaper to 
support. In any event, the authors of this article feel that both regional ombudsman and regional 
constitutional or charter courts, with their different purposes and methods of protection, should 
be equally available in all regions. 
Another factor for the apparently widespread acceptance of regional ombudsmen may be 
their comparatively limited power; results are achieved not by direct means but through enquiry 
and strategic use of adverse publicity. The ombudsman does not have independent executive 
powers to change an administrative decision. Also, in contrast to a finding by a regional 
constitutional or charter court, actions as a result of ombudsman activity would not have any 
precedential value; there is no equivalent of a court ruling on, for example, separation of powers 
issues which could have significance beyond the individual circumstance. Therefore a regional 
government and legislature may feel more comfortable dealing with an ombudsman, rather than 
being judged by a constitutional or charter court. 
In early November 2017 the UK NGO (non-governmental organization) “Rights in Russia” 
flagged up one other possible motive for the apparent support of regional ombudsmen.41 It cited 
a critical article by Igor Averkiev, executive director of the Perm Civic Chamber, posted on the 
Moscow Helsinki Group site.42 In it Averkiev suggested that careful selection of personnel could 
ensure that the most crucial issues of individual rights—and particularly political rights—would 
not be dealt with by a regional ombudsman in any way which might cause a conflict with the 
regional government, and particularly its head, the regional governor. This view may be overly 
cynical. The 2015 federal law specifies that a regional ombudsman will be put into, and relieved 
from, office by the regional legislature (article 16.1, paragraph 4) with a broad right of candidate 
nomination (paragraph 12), including by: 
 
the highest official of the subject of the Russian Federation (the regional president or 
                                                 
41 Igor Averkiev, “On the office of human rights ombudsperson and human rights in Perm Region,” available at 
<http://www.rightsinrussia.info/advisory-council/advisory-committee/averkiev>. 





governor, republic head or the head of the regional government), deputies (group of 
deputies, or factions) of the regional legislative (representative) assemblies, local 
government bodies, human rights organizations, and other bodies and organizations.43  
 
Thus, the governor does not officially have the power to hire and fire, nor exclusive control over 
nominating personnel. However, in practice it well may be that a regional governor or 
government would have ways and means to influence who is a candidate, to ensure that the 
ombudsman is someone with whom they can have ‘helpful’ relations. As is often the case in 
Russia, personnel are key, and it may be that negotiations ‘between officials’ are more kindly 
regarded by regional executives and legislatures than the risk of adverse judgment by a 
constitutional or charter court. 
 
4 The Establishment (or Lack) of Regional Constitutional and Charter Courts 
 
We now return to the courts, such as exist.44 A survey of the current courts shows that the 
majority of republics have established a constitutional court (14 out of 22; just over 60%).45 
However, in respect to the other federation subjects, the situation is much bleaker. At the present 
                                                 
43 Available at <http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/617608/#ixzz51nWwL89z>. 
44 For more about the history of regional constitutional (charter) courts existence and law, drafts of law see for 
example: Svetlana Eduardovna Nesmeianova, Konstitutsionnyi sudebnyi protsess v Rossii: Uchebnoe posobie 
(RIOR: Infra-M, Moscow, 2012), 157-162; Mikhail Alekseevich Mitiukov, Sergei Vladimirovich Kabyshev; V.K 
Bobova, and S.E. Zaslavskii (eds.), Problemy Obrazovaniia i Deiatel’nosti Konstitutsionnykh (Ustavnykh) Sudov 
Sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Materialy Vserossiiskogo Soveshchaniia (Moscow, 24 December 1999) (Formula 
prava, Moscow, 2000); Zh.I. Ovsepian, Stanovlenie konstitutsionnykh i udysvykh sudov v Sub”ektakh Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii (1999-2000) (IKTS MarT, Moscow, 2001).  
45 Adygeya; Bashkortostan; Buriatiia; Dagestan ; Ingushetiia; Kabardino-Balkariia; Kareliia; Komi; 
Marii El; Sakha (Iakutia); Northern Osetia-Alaniia; Tatarstan; Tyva; and Chechniia. In an article by Elena 
Buerachnaia in the Baikal Daily (26 February 2016) available at <https://www.baikal-daily.ru/news/19/196012/> 
Deputy Sergei Mezenin noted that “today the Constitutional Courts operate in 14 republics, another five do not, two 





time (early 2018) only two regions (Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk) and one city of federal 
significance (St. Petersburg) actually have working courts. In her 2012 publication, Belianskaia 
noted, “After 2003, when the charter court of the Kaliningrad Region was established, no courts 
of this kind were created in the regions.” 46 (In fact, in the year her paper was published the short-
lived Cheliabinsk regional charter court was established; see more in on this below in section 6, 
Courts under Threat.) The effect, according to Belianskaia, was that “… only about 20.5% of 
subjects have constitutional (charter) courts.”47  
In some federation subjects legislation to establish a court was passed but not put into 
action. So, for example, “the City of Moscow Charter has had provisions since its adoption in 
1995 for a charter court (article 50, with article 51 on the judiciary) but none has been created.”48 
In 1997 legislation for a charter court was adopted in the then Khanti-Mansi autonomous area 
but no court created.49 A similar situation pertains in Tiumen, with a law in 1998, and 
Krasnoiarsk, likewise in 1999.50 The Belgorod Region Charter was amended in 2003 to allow for 
the creation of a charter court (as well as justice of the peace courts)51, but no charter court has 
been established there. More recently, in Irkutsk region, the charter Court should have started 
                                                 
46 Olga Viktorovna Belianskaia, “K Voprosu o Neobkhodimosti Sozdaniia Ustavnogo Suda Tambovskoi Oblasti [On 
the issue of the need to establish a charter court of the Tambov region],” 12 (116) Vestnik Tambovskogo Universiteta 
(2012), 481-6.  
47 Ibid., 482. 
48 Noted in (no author given) “Review,” of Viktor N. Demidov, Konstitutionnoe (Ustavnoe) Pravosudie Sub’ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Mekhanizme Zashchity Prav i Svobod Cheloveka i Grazhdanina [Constitutional (Charter) 
Justice of the Subjects of the Russian Federation as a Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms 
(authors’ translation.)], (Kazan University, Kazan, 2014) in 3 Gosudarstvo i Pravo (2015), 124-5 available at 
<http://naukarus.com/b-n-demidov-konstitutsionnoe-ustavnoe-pravosudie-subektov-rossiyskoy-federatsii-v-
mehanizme-zaschity-prav-i-svobod-chelov>, 
49 Marina L’vovna Belykh, “Regional’naia konstitutsionnaia iustitsiia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” in Aktual’nye 
Problemy Teorii i Praktiki Konstitutsionnogo Sudoproizvodstva (vypusk VIII) (Kazan University, Kazan, 2013), 
131-7, 132. 
50 See Henderson op.cit. note 30, 32, and also Alexei Trochev, “Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial 
Review in Russia,” 38(3) Law & Society Review (2004), 513-48, 533. 





work on 1 January 2015 on the basis of a law passed the previous year, but by mid 2016 was still 
not functioning as the new governor had refused to nominate judges.52 This is examined further 
below in section 6, Courts under Threat. 
This very patchy provision of constitutional/charter courts clearly raises severe issues of 
equality of opportunity to defend rights and freedoms, which article 19 of Constitution RF 
requires, not to mention undercutting federal Constitution Article 46(1) which guarantees to each 
judicial defence of their rights and freedoms.53 
This issue of why there has been reluctance to set up courts was explored in some depth by 
political scientist Alexei Trochev in his 2004 article “Less Democracy, More Courts: a Puzzle of 
Judicial Review in Russia”.54 Trochev reported, “Of the [then] eighty-nine regions, fifty-six 
established courts in their constitutions/charters, twenty passed court statutes, and seventeen of 
those created courts in reality, two of which failed.” As he summarises in the paper’s abstract, 
his analysis found: 
 
that constitutional courts emerged only in those regions where governors virtually 
guaranteed their re-election by consolidating their political power vis-a-vis federal and 
local governments. …. The changes in the balance of power between those governors, who 
aspired to have their own judicial system, and the federal government that insisted on a 
single federal judicial system, determined the variation in the process of court-building 
                                                 
52 See Zoa Khamiduppina, “Ustavnyi sud poshel po instanstiiam [Charter court went on appeal],”’ Irsiti!ru (21 
January 2016) available at <https://ircity.ru/articles/10210/#; (no author given), “Na Sergeia Levchenko podan isk za 
zatiagvanie protsessa sozdaniia Ustavnogo suda,” Irkutsk onlain (14 January 2016) available at 
<http://www.irk.ru/news/20160114/claim/>.  
53 See for further discussion Henderson, op.cit. note 30, 31. The CCRF has shown concern to protect human rights in 
regions where there is no court; see Olga Andreevna Kovyun and Nataliia Dmitrievna Tereshchenko, 
“Konstitutsionnyi Sud RF v Mekhanizme obespecheniia konstitutsionnosti zakonodatel’stva Krasnodarskogo Kraia v 
Oblasti Prav i Svobod Cheloveka,” 3 Konstitutsionnoe i Munitsipal’noe Pravo (2016), 42-5; Mikhail Ivanovich 
Kleandrov [CCRF Judge], “V Zashchitu Konstitutsionnykh (Ustavnykh) Sudov Sub”ektov RF,” 6 Rossiiskaia 
Iustitsiia (2015), 2-7.  




across Russian regions.55 
 
Trochev suggested that “only very powerful governors could resist federal attempts to 
concentrate power at the federal level, including the judicial system. These governors amassed 
sufficient power to both control federal courts located in their regions and afford their own 
constitutional court.”56 Trochev postulates three waves of regional court building in the 1990s in 
line with political developments, with the final wave following the adoption of the 1996 FCL on 
the Judicial System.57 Nevertheless, as Trochev pointed out, whilst some regions incorporated 
the wording from the 1996 FCL into their charters, few established working courts. Trochev 
explains this: 
 
As the idea of championing autonomy from the federal government became less accepted 
in Moscow, regional political elites did not need such attributes of independent statehood 
as regional courts. These elites witnessed the shift in the role of these courts—from the 
guardians of constitutions/charters protecting against federal encroachment to the arms of 
federal government ensuring the compliance of regional laws with federal laws.58 
 
Thus, regional lawmakers were aware of the impact courts might have in overseeing and 
monitoring their activities.  
But the thrust of Trochev’s study was to test from a political scientist’s perspective 
whether the ‘judicial empowerment thesis’ of court-building as ‘an elite driven process of the 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 518-9. 
57 The first wave, April 1990-October 1993, consisted of Constitutional Supervision Committees established in 11 
republics, with some republics then following the model of the 1991 RSFSR Constitutional Court. Trochev asserts 
(at 528) “the first wave … arose entirely due to the initiative of the political and legal elites in the republics and 
involved both judicial and quasi-judicial bodies of constitutional review.” He sees a reverse wave June 1993-
February 1994, when some courts were dissolved, for example in June 1993 in Chechnya under Dudaev. The second 
wave was April 1994-January 1997 during which 6 republics adopted laws or amended their existing laws and 
charter courts were also created in other federation subjects. The third wave from January 1997 onwards. 




political power distribution’ pertained in Russia.59 Our paper follows up on questions raised in 
Trochev’s conclusion, including, “Should we expect the rise of the rule of law…”60 which would 
be dependent on “the actual impact of judicial review (judgments and their enforcement) on the 
political process, the capacity of the state, and on the well-being of ordinary citizens.”61 In this 
article, we as lawyers explore the drama some courts have had in the struggle for separation of 
powers within regional governance. In other works we have described the activities of some of 
the more active courts, and noted, for example, their recognition, and use, of international human 
rights instruments.62 Here we focus on the attacks on some courts in recent years, and the 
responses to them, to see what these arguments indicate about the development in Russia of 
respect for law and separation of powers. 
Before we consider those disputes, however, we give a brief overview of the functioning 
republican and charter courts. 
 
5 Effective Work - Effective Judges  
 
Some constitutional and charter courts have been notably more active than others. Analysis by 
the current authors of court activity in 2015 showed some marked variation (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Activity of republican constitutional courts and regional charter courts in 2015 
Federation Subject where a Court had 
been established 
Decrees (postanovlenii) i.e. 
judgments after contested 
hearings 
 
Rulings (opredelenii) i.e. 
court declarations where no 
hearing was required 
Republic of Adygeya  0  4 
Republic of Bashkortostan,  2  10 
Republic of Buriatiia,  Not functioning  
Republic of Daghestan,  1  1 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 541. 
60 542. 
61 542. 
62 See e.g. Lomovtseva and Henderson, op.cit. note 29; Jane Henderson and Marina Belykh, “Constitutional Justice 




Republic of Ingushetiia,  1 2 
Kabardino-Balkarian Republic,  1  0 
Republic of Karelia,  2  7 
Komi Republic,  4  3 
Republic of Marii El,  2  2 
Republic of Sakha (Iakutia),  4  1 
Republic of North Osetia-Alania,  3  5 
Republic of Tatarstan,  20  15 
Republic of Tuva,  0 0 
Chechen Republic)  No information  
Kaliningrad oblast,  11 69  
(some interlocutory) 
Sverdlovsk oblast  5  1 to terminate proceedings 
St. Petersburg 3 9 
Irkutsk Not functioning  
Chelabinsk Not functioning  
 
The courts in Tatarstan and Kaliningrad, and to a slightly lesser extent Sverdlovsk, are well 
known to be consistently active. A close study by Dr Belykh of the type of cases with which they 
tend to deal evidences their important role in the protection of local inhabitants’ rights. 
Specifically, it is mainly social-economic rights which are supported; the rights which have a 
very immediate impact on citizens’ actual everyday existence.63 We must stress that it is the 
quality and effect rather than the quantity of decisions made by these courts that is important, as 
the application of cogent legal argument to strike down unconstitutional activities by the regional 
legislature and/or government would have deep political and social significance in the regional 
context.  
That these courts take their legal role seriously is unsurprising given the overall high level 
of legal expertise of their judges. A snapshot taken in the summer of 2017 of judges listed on the 
relevant court websites as currently serving indicated that of the 62 judges for whom sufficiently 
detailed information was available, all had a law degree, and over half (26 out of 51) had a 
higher law degree (kandidat or doktor iuridicheskikh nauk). Beyond that, 23 out of 51 also had 
an academic role in teaching law, either previously, or on a part-time basis while serving as 
judge. 15 judges were specifically listed as having extensive legal publications. In assessing the 
                                                 




importance of this information, it is worth bearing in mind that, in line with Russia’s heritage as 
a Romanist-style codified legal system (certainly in form, even though the closeness of the 
relationship to other systems within that family grouping might be arguable),64 in Russia the 
cultural tradition is to give deep respect to legal academics, professors and academicians. The 
latter are the most esteemed of all legal professionals. The strong academic credentials of so 
many court judges is thus an extremely positive feature. 
These data showing a significant overlap between legal academia and those administering 
regional constitutional justice can only be presented as a qualitative picture; there are no real 
comparators to allow deeper analysis.65 Nevertheless, the richness of legal expertise brought by 
these exemplars to their judicial roles is impressive. In line with this, the knowledge about and 
use of international law in the more active courts (the three charter courts Sverdlovsk, St 
Petersburg and Kaliningrad, and the constitutional court in the Republic of Tatarstan) is also 
noteworthy.66  
As noted, the positive role of the most active courts has a value which is impossible to 
assess in monetary terms.67 A similar point was made in 2015 by Viktor Nikolaevich Demidov, 
the retired chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Tatarstan.68 He also noted:  
                                                 
64 For a perceptive overview and analysis see William Partlett, “Re-Classifying Russian Law: Mechanisms, 
Outcomes, and Solutions for an Overly Politicized Field” 2(1) Columbia Journal of East European Law (2008), 1-
55.  
65 Although survey data in Vadim Volkov and Aryna Dzmitryieva “Recruitment patterns, gender, and professional 
subcultures of the judiciary in Russia,” 22(2) International Journal of the Legal Profession (2015), 166-192 at 172 
show how infrequently domestic court judges have any similar academic background; in the 2011 survey, only 3.7 
percent had previously worked in Higher education institutions; by 2013 this was reduced to 2.2 percent.  
66 See discussion in Henderson and Belykh, op.cit. note 11. 
67 Henderson and Belykh, op.cit. note 11, 10. 
68 Viktor Nikolaevich Demidov, “Zashchita Prav i Svobod Grazhdan Konstitutsionnymi (Ustavnymi) Sudami 
Sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens by the Constitutional (Charter) 
Courts of Subjects of the Russian Federation],” 7 Gosudarstvo i Pravo (2015), 17-26 available at 
<http://naukarus.com/zaschita-prav-i-svobod-grazhdan-konstitutsionnymi-ustavnymi-sudami-subektov-rossiyskoy-
federatsii>. Note his other works e.g. Viktor Nikolaevich Demidov, “Konstitutsionnoe Pravosudie Sub”ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Obshchegosudarstvennoi Sisteme Zashchity Prav i Svobod Cheloveka i Grazhdanina 





It is a typical case that over two-thirds (about 75 per cent) of the final decisions of 
constitutional (charter) courts for the entire period of their existence (from 1992 to the 
present time) were made on complaints of citizens and their associations about violations 
of the constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen.69  
 
He points out that this fits with the “general trend in constitutional justice in our country, since 
the share of final decisions in the form of a judgment (postanovlenie) on the protection of human 
and civil rights and freedoms in the practice of the CCRF over the past decade (2002-2013)) is 
also about 75 per cent.”70  
As well as the inestimably important work of supporting practical rights, the significance 
of the courts’ work in relation to the issue of abuse of power was cogently expressed in 2014 by 
Aleksandr Vladimirovich Savos’kin, and Anton Olegovich Kazantsev:  
 
During the relatively short period of its existence, regional constitutional justice has proved 
its social necessity and relevance. According to the official websites of constitutional 
(charter) courts, hundreds of regional laws and other normative acts have been found not to 
comply with the constitutions and charters of the constituent subjects of the Federation.71  
 
We will see in the next section, Courts under Threat, that in two instances—one in a republic and 
one in a region—a court came under attack following a case where it ruled against one of the 
other branches of state power. In both situations, court protection of citizen’s rights brought it 
into conflict with the regional government, with unfortunate consequences. 
                                                 
System for the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen (Methodology, Theory, Practice)],” 
[Thesis for a doctorate in law] (Russian State University of Justice, Moscow, 2016).  
69 Demidov 2015, op.cit. note 68, online version no page given. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Aleksandr Vladimirovich Savos’kin and Anton Olegovich Kazantsev, “Vozmozhno Li Uprazdnenie 
Konstitutsionnogo (Ustavnogo) Suda Sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii? [Is it possible to abolish the constitutional 





6 Courts under Threat 
 
Having noted earlier how few courts have been established, we now turn to the worrying 
development of courts being “retired”. In recent times there have been three instances of the 
cessation of an existing court, as well as three unsuccessful attempts to abolish the St. Petersburg 
charter Court; each time the bill was rejected by the majority of deputies.72  
The first attack was on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Buriatiia, and involved 
suspension, rather than complete abolition. The Buriatiia Constitutional Court had come into 
existence following legislation in 1994, with an establishment of three judges.73 In early 2012 the 
court chairman Kapiton A. Budayev resigned.74 This left the court inquorate. Article 5 of the 
establishing legislation said that any judicial vacancy should be filled within 3 months, but this 
did not happen. Further, the five-year term of office of the two remaining judges expired in 2013. 
Then the court’s funding was terminated by a budgetary law adopted on 14 November 2013 by 
the republic’s legislature, the People’s Khural.75 The republican budget made no provision for 
the court’s costs, apart from pensions for retired judges.76 With no budget, the court was 
suspended from the beginning of 2015.  
Disquiet at this was registered at the federal level and consequently, a group of State Duma 
deputies appealed to the CCRF, claiming that the effect of the budgetary law deprived citizens of 
their right to appeal to the republican constitutional court and also that it breached the principle 
                                                 
72 Ibid. The dates of the attempts are not given. 
73 Law of the Republic Buriatiia, “On the Constitutional Court of the Republic Buriatiia” of 25 October 1994, no. 
42-1. 
74 Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 71.  
75 The following summary draws on Henderson and Belykh, op.cit. note 11. See also Iulii Grigor’evich Khamnuev 
and Aldar Eduardovich Erdyneev, “Kazus konstitutsionnogo suda respubliki Buriatiia: postanovka problemy c tolku 
zreniia konstitutsionnoi teorii,” 3(74) Sibirskii Iuridicheskii Vestnik (2016), 49-53, available at 
<https://cyberleninka.ru/article/v/kazus-konstitutsionnogo-cuda-respubliki-buryatiya-postanovka-problemy-s-
tochki-zreniya-konstitutsionnoy-teorii>. 
76 Law of the Republic Buriatiia, “On the Suspension of Operation and Loss of Force of Certain Legislative Acts of 




of separation of powers. The CCRF issued a ruling on 3 March 2015 agreeing with them.77 It 
noted that although the FCL on the Judicial System RF gave federation subjects an absolutely 
free choice as to whether or not to create an appropriate constitutional or charter court, once 
established, such a court could not be suspended merely through the provisions of a budgetary 
law. If abolition were desired, the federation subject legislature would need to adopt suitable 
legislation. A budgetary law should only contain provisions related to revenues and expenditure, 
and it was therefore not apposite that it should alter existing rights and obligations. In particular, 
a budgetary law could not be used to change the legal status and functioning of a constitutional 
or charter court. This would be an: 
 
unacceptable interference with the legislative power in the function of the institutions of 
justice, violate the position on the separation of powers established by the Russian 
Constitution, autonomy of the agencies of judicial power, independence of judges and of 
court funding, which is necessary to ensure the independent administration of justice 
(Constitution articles 10, 120, and 124).78  
 
This clear CCRF ruling that the suspension of the Republic Buriatia Constitutional Court was 
unconstitutional encouraged the People’s Khural to adopt legislation in 2016 to reinstate the 
court.79 (See section 7, The Fightback, particularly text below to notes 110-114.  
The second attack, chronologically speaking, was in the Cheliabinsk region. A charter 
court began work there in 2012, following adoption of a law on the court on 27 October 2011. 
However in early 2014 the then new Acting Governor Boris Dubrovskii abolished it. His 
justification was that the judges in the court had arrived at a different conclusion to the CCRF in 
relation to the law of Cheliabinsk region of 28 November 2002 “On Transport Tax”.  
The issue before the court was the reduction of tax paid by certain groups of people, 
                                                 
77 N 421-O, “Po zaprosu gruppy deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy o proverke konstitutsionnosti puncta 2 chasti 1 
stat’i 1 Zakona Respubliki Buriatiia ‘O priostanovlenii deistviia i priznanii utrativshimi silu otdel’nykh 
zakonodatel’nykh aktov Respubliki Butiatiia’ v sviazi s prizniatiem zakonom Respubliki Buriatiia ‘O 
respublikanskom biudzhete na 2015 god i na planovyi period 2016 i 2017 godov’”. 
78 Ibid. 
79 As reported by the Baikal-Daily, suspended 2014 until that date. 
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namely the elderly or families with three or more children under the age of 18. The Cheliabinsk 
charter court ruled on 12 February 2013 that the law unjustifiably restricted the right of these 
people to social support. In contrast, the CCRF concluded on 2 December 2013 that the 
regulation in the Cheliabinsk law of tax privileges did not contradict the Constitution RF. The 
acting governor suggested that this disparity of view indicated that the Cheliabinsk charter court 
judges had insufficient legal expertise. This of course ignored the fact that the Cheliabinsk law 
“On Transport Tax” was being considered in two completely different contexts, and in relation to 
two different constitutive laws, i.e. the Cheliabinsk charter and the Constitution RF. It is 
perfectly possible for there to be justifiably different decisions in such circumstances.  
In their analysis of the legality of abolishing regional constitutional and charter courts 
Savos’kin and Kazantsev noted that the draft legislation to dissolve the Cheliabinsk charter court 
was introduced by the Acting Governor, Boris Dubrovskii, almost as soon as he took up the post, 
after the previous governor had prematurely relinquished office in mid January 2014.80 Both the 
law amending the Cheliabinsk charter (to remove mention of the court), and the law purporting 
to abolish the court were adopted very swiftly (all three readings in one session), with no prior 
warning or discussion, and absolutely no consultation with the judges. The two pieces of draft 
legislation were only put onto the legislature’s agenda at the plenary meeting itself. “According 
to the chairman of the Cheliabinsk region Charter Court Evgenii Gennad’evich Eremeev, 
‘everything happened very quickly, unclearly and secretively’.”81 
Savos’kin and Kazantsev also suggested that the regional legislature was happy to abolish 
the court because it did not like adverse criticism. They point out that: 
 
                                                 
80 Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 71 citing Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 15 January 
2014 N 21 “O dostrochnom prekrashchenii polnomochii Gubernatora Cheliabinskoi oblasti [On the early 
termination of the powers of the Governor of the Chelyabinsk Region]” available on the database at 
<http://www.pravo.gov.ru>. 
81 Interview with the Chairman of the Charter Court of the Cheliabinsk Region Evgenii G. Eremeev, “Evgenii 
Eremeev: ‘Vse proizochlo ochen’ bistro, neponiatno i skrytno [Everything happened very quickly, unclearly and 
secretively],” cited in note 10 of Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 69, 1109 and available in the online edition 




It is significant that about half of all cases reviewed by the Cheliabinsk Region’s Charter 
Court concerned regional laws. Even more revealing is the fact that the first (in the order of 
adoption) of the judgments of the Cheliabinsk Region Charter Court82 was immediately 
extremely negatively received by the legislator.” 83 
 
In it, the Charter Court decided that some provisions of the Cheliabinsk law “On Transport 
Tax”84 did not comply with the Cheliabinsk Regional Charter. The court decision was clearly 
significant for the particular citizens whose rights were upheld, but this was a fairly small group 
(pensioners with vehicles with an engine capacity of over 150 horsepower) so there would be 
little adverse impact on the region’s transport tax revenues.  
 
Despite this, the Legislative Assembly of Cheliabinsk Region has strongly opposed the 
judgment of the Charter Court, considering it as an intervention in the discretion of a 
legislator of a subject of the Russian Federation… One gets the impression that for the 
Cheliabinsk Region Legislative Assembly the very idea that someone has the right to 
correct the result of its activities—regional laws—was unacceptable.85  
 
The third instance of a court adversely impacted by behaviour from one of the other branches of 
power was in Irkutsk region. Here the problem was deliberate inactivity. A law was adopted in 
May 2014 to establish an Irkutsk charter court, to begin work on 1 January 2015. A competition 
was established to find suitable judicial candidates, and four names were put forward by the then 
                                                 
82 Note 11 of Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 71, 1110: Decree of the Charter Court of the Cheliabinsk Region 
of 12 February 2013 N 001/13-P, “Po delu o cootvetstvii Ustavu (Osnovnomy Zakonu) Cheliabinskoi oblasti 
otdel’nykh polozhennii stat’I 2, punktov 2 i 3 stat’I 4 Zakona Cheliabinskoi oblasti ot 28 noiabria 2002 goda 
No.114-ZO ‘O transportnom naloge’ v sviazi c zhaloboi grazhdanki Andreevoi N.P.” 26 Iuzhnoural’skaiia 
Panorama (2013) no page given.  
83 Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 69, 1110. 
84 Note 12 of of Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 71, 1110: law of the Cheliabinsk region of November 28, 
2002 N 114-ZO (as amended on February 12, 2013) “O transportnom naloge [On transport tax],”134 
Iuzhnoural’skaiia Panorama (2002) no page given.  




governor, Sergei Eroschenko, for approval by the regional parliament. Then a new governor, 
Sergei Levchenko, was elected and inaugurated. Levchenko withdrew the nominations, on the 
pretext that he needed to get acquainted with their details. In January 2016 three of the four 
withdrawn candidates—Alexei Petrov, judge of the Regional Commercial (Arbitrazh) Court, 
Nikolai Sedykh and Oleg Trankevich, a judge of the Irkutsk garrison military court—brought a 
administrative (judicial review) case against Levchenko in the Kirov District Court.86 On 21 
January 2016 the Court refused to satisfy the claim, asserting the governor had the right to 
withdraw candidate nominations from the legislature. Although one online news outlet suggested 
that there might be an appeal against this decision,87 there is no report of any. 
We thus have three clear examples where in recent years, either from malign positive 
action or deliberate inaction, the regional executive, often supported by the regional legislature, 
has brought the activity of a regional constitutional or charter court to a halt. As the current 
authors postulated previously: 
 
It is extremely tempting to suggest that, ironically, such resistance to the existence of a 
charter court by the head of the regional executive strongly emphasises the importance of 
such a court and the significant role which it would play in supporting rule of law, 
separation of powers, and the rights of the individual, particularly against executive 
encroachment.88 
  
7 The Fightback—the Movement to Strengthen and Expand Regional Constitutional 
Justice 
 
This sidelining and abolishing constitutional and charter courts by legislative and executive 
                                                 
86 Information from Khamiduppina, op.cit. note 52.  
87 No author given, “Isk k gubernatoru za zatiagivanie sozdaniia Ustavnogo suda otklonili v Irkutske [Lawsuit 
against the governor for delaying the creation of the Charter Court rejected in Irkutsk]” IRK.ru 21 January 2016 
available at <https://www.irk.ru/news/20160121/reject/>. 




branches of power—described as ‘alarming’ by Savos’kin and Kazantsev89—has not been 
accepted quietly. It seems to have spurred a vociferous defense of the courts, in particular 
stressing the importance of their role in relation to separation of powers and the rule of law. As 
Savos’kin and Kazantsev note, “the existence of a conflict between the legislative and judicial 
bodies is a perfectly understandable and normal state of affairs from the point of view of the 
theory of separation of powers. Moreover, this is evidence of the actual functioning of the 
principle of separation of powers, as well as a sign of real democracy.”90 They and others have 
taken to print to educate those who would rather be regional autocrats. 
Some of this seeming campaign to raise awareness of the value of constitution and charter 
courts was clearly motivated by the events in Chelabinsk, but there were earlier precursors. 
Aleksandr Mikhailovich Tsaliev informs us that a Resolution was adopted at the All-Russian 
Congress of Judges of 16 December 2012 which recognized the important role of such courts in 
assisting guarantee of citizens’ rights through their judicial protection.91  
Also in 2012, as part of her advocacy for a charter court to be established in the Tambov 
region, Olga V. Belianskaia cited the important function of constitutional and charter courts in 
regional law making, as they police whether or not regional legislation conforms to the relevant 
constitution or charter.92  
However, the high-handed action of the Acting Governor in Chelabinsk abolishing its 
                                                 
89 Savos’kin and Kazantsev, op.cit. note 71, 1109: “At the same time, in 2014, alarming [trevozhhye] trends 
evidenced the potential for the abolition of constitutional (charter) courts in certain constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation.”  
90 Ibid., 1110. 
91 “O sostoianin sudebnoi sistemy Rossiiskoi Federatsii i osnobnykh napravleniiakh ee razvitiia v 2012-2016 godakh 
[On the state of the judicial system of the Russian Federation and its main directions for its development in 2012-
2016,” cited in Aleksandr Mikhailovich Tsaliev, “Zakonkdatel’noe i organizatsionno-prakticheskoe obespechenie 
sozdaniia i razvitiia konstitutsionnykh (ustavnykh) sudov v sub”ektakh RF [Legislative and organizational-practical 
support for the creation and development of constitutional (charter) courts in the subjects of the Russian 
Federation],” 3 Iuridicheskaia Nauka (2013), 66-71 at 69.  
92 Olga Viktorovna Belianskaia, “K voprosu o neobkhodimosti sozdaniia ustavnogo suda Tambovskoi Oblasti [On 
the issue of the need to create a charter court of the Tambov region],” 12(116) Vestnik Tambovskogo Universiteta, 




charter court in 2014 prompted pointed and scathing comment. In June of that year Aleksandr 
Vladimirovich Savos’kin and Anton Olegovich Kazantsev published a joint article entitled “Is It 
Possible to Abolish the Constitutional (Charter) Court of a Constituent Entity of the Russian 
Federation?”93 These authors are no lightweights: Savos’kin has the degree of Candidate of 
Juridical Sciences, and is an associate professor at the Ural State Economy University and 
adviser to the judges at the Sverdlovsk Charter Court94; Kazantsev, also a Candidate of Juridical 
Sciences, is Deputy Chairman of that Court.95 Their carefully deduced conclusion was that the 
way in which the Chelabinsk court was abolished was absolutely illegal. The same conclusion 
was expressed again by Savos’kin, publishing jointly with Anatolii Tikhanovich Karasev, 
Professor of the Department of Constitutional Law at the Ural State Juridical Academy (now 
University).96 
The main reasoning is as follows.97 Although according to the 1996 FCL on the Judicial 
System constitutional and charter courts of federation subjects are themselves not federal courts, 
they are included in the single judicial system of the Russian Federation, and, importantly, their 
judges have the same legal status as all other judges, which means that there are a number of 
federal laws which limit the powers of regional executives and legislators in respect to them. 
Article 17(2) of the 1996 FCL on the Judicial System gives federation subjects the power 
to create and abolish constitutional and charter courts. The same FCL establishes the principles 
for creating such a court, but gives no other specifications. According to the way the Russian 
codified system works, where there is no precise legal rule—“lex specialis”98—then general 
norms are applied. Article 17(3) of the FCL makes it clear that a court cannot be abolished if the 
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issues which it would adjudicate are not simultaneously transferred to the jurisdiction of another 
court. Transfer of an abolished court’s jurisdiction to a nonjudicial body is in clear breach of this 
provision. Savos’kin and Kazantsev note99 that when in 2014 the Highest Commercial Court was 
abolished, to be merged with the existing Supreme Court into a new Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation,100 the jurisdiction of the Highest Commercial Court was specifically 
transferred to the new Supreme Court. This was made explicit in Article 2(2) of the Federal Law 
on the Amendment to the Constitution which dealt with the necessary constitutional changes to 
allow the establishment of the new Supreme Court RF.101  
“Analysis of federal laws on the abolition of courts (and there are about a hundred of them) 
clearly shows that all laws, without exception, contain rules on the transfer of authority.”102 
Savos’kin and Kazantsev draw attention to the three (failed) attempts by the St Petersburg 
legislature to abolish the St Petersburg charter court, where each time the legislature at least 
made an attempt to transfer jurisdiction. Unfortunately—and wrongly—in two of the three they 
attempted to transfer jurisdiction to the legislature itself. In the other attempt,  
 
introduced by MP Yuri Karpenko to the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg in 2007, 
there was a provision on transferring the powers of the Charter Court to the jurisdiction of 
the St. Petersburg City Court. However, already at the stage of preparation for the first 
reading, the project received a negative legal opinion.103 
 
A further article by Kazantsev was published in 2015, on “The Right to Resign as a Guarantee of 
the Constitutional Principle of the Independence of Judges of Constitutional (Charter) Courts in 
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the Context of the ‘Cheliabinsk Case’”.104 Here he reiterated that the abolition of the Cheliabinsk 
charter court was unlawful, and noted that the court judges had filed a lawsuit in the Cheliabinsk 
Central District Court claiming severance pay and compensation, based on Articles 15 and 19 of 
the 1992 law “On the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation”. The Central District Court 
found that the judges had neither resigned nor retired, so were not entitled to severance pay and 
compensation.105 An appeal to the Cheliabinsk Regional Court left this unchanged, and 
confirmed that the judges’ powers were terminated on grounds other than retirement.106 The 
legislation107 which abolished the judges’ position thus had wrongfully deprived them of rights 
established in federal law. 
The judges were not the only people adversely impacted. Cheliabinsk residents were 
deprived of an additional and effective remedy.108 This most obviously affected those whose 
complaints had already been accepted by the court. Savos’kin and Kazantsev were careful to 
confirm that it was not impossible for a regional constitutional or charter court to be abolished, 
but emphasised that such abolition must be done through a correct legislative procedure, 
including suitable transfer of jurisdiction. Acting otherwise is arbitrary, and  
 
in violation of the constitutional principle of the rule of law and clear evidence of violation 
of the principle of separation of powers, when on the regional level, one branch of 
government (legislative) not only interferes with but destroys the other (judicial) branch of 
power.”109 
 
So far the Cheliabinsk situation is unresolved. However, our first ‘attacked’ court is now being 
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resurrected, albeit somewhat falteringly. 
On 26 February 2016 it was reported in the Baikal Daily that the Constitutional Court of 
Buriatiia would “return to life”,110 although in practice it would still be inactive. As noted above 
(text to note 74 and following) in 2015 the suspension of the Buriatiia Constitutional Court had 
been challenged in Constitutional Court RF by State Duma deputies. The CCRF recommended a 
choice between either complete abolition, or funding the court so that it could resume work. 
Following this, Boris Botoev, Chairman of the Committee on the Rule of Law and State of the 
People’s Khural (the Republic of Buriatiia legislature), introduced a bill to the People’s Khural 
to resuscitate the court. He had the support of two of the six committees in the Khural, as well as 
comments from the republic’s government and Audit Chamber. There was some heated 
discussion in the People’s Khural, with reference to the cost and how well Buriatiia had been 
functioning without an active court, but the bill was adopted at first reading after Botoev had 
lambasted his fellow deputies on lack of principle. 
 
You can not treat the Constitutional Court as a cash cow. You give 15 litres of milk to 
feed, it gave one litre to kill. Everything is changed. Even if the Constitutional Court is 
simply standing and guarding the legal obligations of our citizens as a watchdog, this is 
also a big plus. But one should not approach the third [judicial] power in such a utilitarian 
way. You are right. Let’s postpone it, take [the vote] in the autumn. Do as your conscience 
dictates,” Boris Botoev exhaled doomfully.111  
 
It appears that his exasperation persuaded the legislature at least to adopt the relevant law.  
The issue was further discussed at the last session of the Buriat People’s Khural for 2017, 
held on 30 November.112 There some deputies questioned the need to revive the republic’s 
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constitutional court. The context for reopening the issue centred round the process for 
nominating and appointing the court chairman and judges. However, the court received strong 
support, not only from many individual deputies (including one, Communist Bair Tsyrenov, who 
had repeatedly picketed for its reinstatement), but also from the Khural’s committees, the 
Prosecutor’s Office, Accounting Chamber, and Ministry of Justice representation in Buriatiia. 
The relevant legislation was immediately adopted in two readings, and signed into law by the 
republic’s governor.  
At the post-session press conference, Botoev himself was questioned whether he would 
become court chairman, but denied any earlier invitation for that role. He chided the journalists 
as running ahead of events. He also noted that he expected the court to come into existence in 
spring 2018, having “been ‘neither alive nor dead’ for four years”.113 A former member of the 
Social Chamber (Obshchestvanniia Palata), Pavel Dudin, spoke in support of the court, saying 
that in its 17 years existence it had issued more than a hundred judgments and rulings which was 
quite a few, in the circumstances. He also said, in relation to the cost of the court: 
  
We talked with our colleagues, judges of the St. Petersburg charter court, and they said that 
by the same logic one can talk about an atomic submarine. It also ‘eats’ a lot of money—
more than the budget of the average subject, and has never been deployed, but this does not 
mean that it should be dismantled and the money targeted at something more substantial. 
No, the submarine solves an important strategic objective, and here the constitutional court 
is also called upon to solve an important objective—ensuring the rights of citizens.114 
 
8 What These Disputes Might Indicate about Rule of Law in Russia  
 
We now come to consider what the described disputes tell us about the development in Russia of 
the rule of law, and in particular, the reception of the principle of separation of powers.  
                                                 






It seems to us that the message is clear. Although geographically limited in scope, 
constitutional and charter courts have shown themselves to be sufficiently effective in exercising 
constitutional control over the other regional branches of state power as to be perceived as a 
threat—in particular by regional executive heads. As we have seen, in three instances the 
regional executive has tried to obliterate this threat by removing the court. However, rather than 
apathetically accepting that they are losers in a regional power struggle, the courts’ supporters 
have rallied and fought back with well-articulated arguments grounded in Russia’s constitutional 
law to explain the illegitimacy of the executive actions. We thus have the wonderful irony that 
executive activity illegally attacking the courts has actually shown the depth and strength of legal 
consciousness in the regions as the defenders of the principle of separation of powers come to the 
fore.  
But the fact that these conflicts could arise strongly points up the need for practical steps to 
support the courts and their existence. This is not a new concern but has been a recurring theme. 
According to Aleksandr M. Tsaliev, writing in 2013,115 the Advisory Council of the Chairmen of 
the Constitutional (Charter) Control Authorities in the Russian Federation had appealed in 2001 
to the President, the Federal Assembly, and the federation subjects’ legislative and executive 
agencies, stressing the necessity to create a single system of constitutional justice, via the CCRF 
and federation subjects’ constitutional and charter courts. This would require making the latter 
mandatory, and developing sufficient legislative, organizational and practical support for them. 
As Tsaliev perceptively noted, “as practice shows, firstly, no one ever wants voluntarily to share 
power, and secondly, no one is interested in creating an authority that oversees their 
decisions.”116 So the system of regional constitutional supervision would inevitably remain 
underdeveloped unless federal legislation imposed a duty on each region to establish an 
appropriate court. 
Tsaliev himself published a draft Federal Law “On the General Principles of the 
Organization and Operation of Constitutional (Charter ) Courts of the subjects of the Russian 
                                                 





Federation”.117 Other authors, for example, Victor N. Demidov,118 and Vladimir B. Evdokimov 
(writing with Timur A. Tukhvatullin)119 have also highlighted the need for amendment to the 
1996 FCL on the Judicial System to make the establishment of a constitutional or charter court 
compulsory. Olga Belianskaia advocated adoption at federal level of a model statute to define the 
courts’ roles, along with the encouragement of some federal funding.120  
In a paper published in 2015 Ignatenko (et al.) drawing on experience of the failed attempt 
in 2014 to establish of an Irkutsk Regional Charter Court concluded that comprehensive federal 
regulation is required, particularly to define the status of the regional constitutional and charter 
court judges.121 In the same year Evdokimov and Tukhvatullin, lamenting the lack of courts in 
many regions, strongly advocated a federal law to regulate their activity, basing their argument 
on the principle of separation of powers, and Constitution RF Articles 45 and 46 guaranteeing 
judicial protection of rights and freedoms of man and citizen. Alongside this they advocated 
appropriate amendments (and re-titling) of the federal law “On the Principles of Establishing 
Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power in the Subject of the Russian 
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Federation” noted above,122 to include provisions on regional constitutional courts.123 
The following year, 2016, Anatolii T. Karasev and Aleksandr V. Savos’kin published their 
article cited above124 “Do we need Constitutional justice in the subjects of the Russian 
Federation?” They answered their own question with a resounding “Yes”. Their main 
justifications were the constitutional principle of unity of legal space, the utility of specialist 
courts to supervise constitutionality, and the fact that such courts solve problems which affect 
many people, thus removing social tension. The authors postulated that the wide impact of the 
courts’ activity probably meant they would actually create a net saving of resources. They also 
cited a positive opinion of the CCRF Chairman, Valerii D. Zorkin, that the federation subjects’ 
constitutional and charter courts, “act as mediators in the relations between the authorities and 
society and at the same time are a specific guarantee for the government and the country as a 
whole.”125 Other authors have also stressed the importance of the courts in respect to separation 
and balance of powers.126  
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 Also in 2016 Iulian Nikolaevich Usenko analysed the courts’ role in resolving issues of 
accountability of regional authorities. He suggested that this could be expanded to include a role 
in the expression of no confidence by the regional legislature in the regional executive.127 On an 
analogous theme, in the same year Aleksandr M. Tsaliev promoted the role of constitutional and 
charter courts in combating corruption in their regions.128 
So far, those advocating that Russia’s federation subjects should have a duty to create a 
court have not succeeded in their aim. At least up to the time of writing in early 2018, the federal 
authorities have been reluctant to impose such a duty. However, there is not a complete lack of 
interest. For example, on 14 December 2017 the Chairman of the Federation Council Committee 
on Constitutional Legislation and State Building, Andrei Klishas, hosted a roundtable on the 
“Implementation of decisions of the agencies of constitutional justice: the state of legislation and 
prospects for its development”.129 The event was organized on the initiative of the Sakha 
(Iakutiia) Constitutional Court, whose Chairman had met with Senator Klishas and others the 
previous month, discussed issues relating to constitutional justice in Russia’s regions, and 
formulated the plan to have the Round Table.130 It was attended by a range of representatives, 
including those from the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General’s Office, regional 
government bodies, federation subjects’ constitutional and charter courts, the Public Chamber, 
and the scientific community (including one of the current article’s authors).  
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The first article of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter, Constitution RF) 
defines Russia as a “democratic federated rule of law state (правовое государство; pravovoe 
gosudarstvo) with a republic form of government.”131 The practical ramifications of aspiring to 
be a rule of law state are still being realized in Russia, and progress overall is inconsistent. 
However, when we examine the issue from the perspective of Russia’s regions we see some 
examples of successful implementation of regional courts enforcing regional rights, and, as 
Trochev put it, being bodies which “…uphold democratic values, protect individual rights, and 
serve as a bulwark against the return to the totalitarian past.”132 Some would-be regional 
dictators have baulked at being subject to regional constitutional control, and have implemented 
the simplistic solution of getting rid of their regional constitutional or charter court. However, 
this high-handed approach has triggered a vociferous defence of the role of such courts, and 
indeed flagged up how important the courts are, particularly in relation to separation of powers. 
This strong defence of the courts stands as evidence that this important principle has indeed 
entered the legal consciousness of those striving to improve the rule of law in regional Russia. 
The authors share with them the hope that the federal authorities will take steps to strengthen and 
regularise the role of the courts, by amending the 1996 FCL on the Judicial System to mandate 
rather than merely empower Russia’s regions to establish courts to implement regional 
constitutional oversight, on analogy with the equivalent legislation on the regional ombudsman. 
Similarly, a federal definition of the role and rights of the relevant judges would strengthen their 
position. This would allow for more ‘bottom-up’ realisation of the high aims of Russian 
constitutional law.  
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